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INTRODUCTION 
The ultimate test of proficiency for emergency responders and the systems in which they 
operate is an actual disaster. Fortunately, disasters happen rarely, so responders must 
find alternate ways to practice their skills. The best forms of practice are exercises and 
drills that simulate reality as closely as practicable.1 “The true value of exercises lies in 
the opportunities they offer to practice skills and make mistakes in a low-cost, low-risk, 
low-consequence environment compared with real catastrophes.”2 To fully realize this 
value, the ability of individuals to perform their jobs and to coordinate their efforts 
during an exercise must be evaluated. Though evaluation is essential, standardized 
instruments to assess how well responders perform during an exercise are relatively 
new.   
The purpose of this article is to provide standardized instruments called Exercise 
Evaluation Guides (EEGs) for two public health functions: Epidemiologic Surveillance 
and Investigation and Isolation and Quarantine. These EEGs are intended to aid 
judgment (1) of public health responder performance using the guides’ check-lists and 
(2) of emergency response plans using the guides’ planning sections. In addition to 
providing guidance for evaluators regarding actions they should expect to observe from 
responders, the EEGs present (1) performance measures that measure quality, as 
opposed to more commonly available measures of timeliness, or percent of effort 
completed and (2) planning elements to evaluate adequacy of response plans.   
The guides are particularly useful for evaluation because they rely on observations 
made by an independent third party, as opposed to assessment made by self-report. 
Evaluation done by an independent third party, who is neither playing in the exercise 
nor conducting it, is preferred to self-reported assessment because the former likely 
yields less biased, more credible performance data.  
The initial sections of this article offer background information about EEGs, describe 
the methods used to create them, explain their component elements, and discuss their 
intended use. The EEGs, performance measures, and relevant planning elements are 
then provided as appendices: (1) Epidemiologic Surveillance and Investigation 
(hereafter called Epi), Appendix A; and (2) Isolation and Quarantine, Appendix B.  
BACKGROUND  
The public health EEGs presented here are based on the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) concept of capabilities. The DHS provides a definition of capabilities in 
operational terms: Responders become capable of performing critical tasks to expected 
levels of proficiency through adequate planning, equipping, training, organizing, and 
exercising that includes evaluation and corrective action. Capabilities-based planning 
has been used by the military to plan for flexible configuration and deployment of 
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resources under conditions of great uncertainty. The main question for each capability 
is: If you can help manage an incident, what are you capable of doing? DHS defines 
thirty-seven capabilities in its current version of the Target Capabilities List (September 
2007).3 Two public health capabilities from the list are addressed in this article: (1) 
Epidemiologic Surveillance and Investigation and (2) Isolation and Quarantine. Thus, 
the related public health EEGs are named accordingly.    
These public health EEGs are also consistent with the DHS Homeland Security 
Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP). According to DHS, HSEEP is a “capabilities 
and performance-based exercise program that provides a standardized methodology 
and terminology for exercise design, development, conduct, evaluation, and 
improvement planning.”4 The Exercise Evaluation Guides offered by DHS are also called 
EEGs. The public health EEGs derive their name from the DHS EEGs. Both the DHS 
EEGs and the public health EEGs presented in this article aid the process of evaluation. 
HOW THESE PUBLIC HEALTH EEGS DIFFER FROM THE DHS EEGS 
The Planning Section 
Each of the two public health EEGs presented in this article has a section to help with 
planning, a requirement for exemplary performance during real or mock disasters. 
Ideally, emergency planners anticipate the needs of responders by examining lessons 
learned from past events, projecting how a response might unfold, inventorying 
available resources, and projecting resource shortfalls. Industry “best practices” are 
often well represented in effective plans. However, the process of planning is frequently 
cited as being more valuable than having a written plan. Planning promotes responder 
collaboration, whereas plans do not necessarily assure it. Such conventional wisdom 
notwithstanding, by using the planning checklists evaluators can detect strengths and 
potential vulnerabilities in preparedness. Evaluators can conduct a pre-exercise 
document review to help determine whether planning is adequate. If a jurisdiction has 
paid careful attention to planning, it typically has written evidence to substantiate its 
efforts. Also, if player performance does not meet expectations, evaluators can consider 
planning deficiencies when analyzing the reasons why performance is not as expected. 
For example, in the Isolation and Quarantine EEG, Appendix B1: Planning, if a 
jurisdiction’s planners diligently identified alternate quarantine facilities before a 
pandemic, they will likely have current memoranda of agreement in place with those 
facilities to expedite transfer of legal authority to use the facility in an emergency.  
Performance Measures based on Quality 
Exercise evaluators must be able to determine whether players’ actions and decisions 
are (1) appropriate (the right action), (2) timely (done at the right time), and (3) of 
acceptable quality (done the right way) to achieve the intended outcomes. This article 
suggests measures of performance based on quality, namely quality decision-making 
and quality work products. The performance measures in the DHS EEGs tend to 
emphasize evaluation based on timeliness and occasionally on percent of effort 
completed.    
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SIMILARITIES TO THE HOMELAND SECURITY EXERCISE AND 
EVALUATION PROGRAM (HSEEP) AND THE DHS EEGS 
Like the DHS EEGs, the public health EEGs are modular. Modularity allows exercise 
designers to combine different activities and critical tasks from within and between 
instruments in a “mix and match” fashion to create an evaluation specific for the 
exercise being developed. DHS describes the process at their HSEEP website, which 
links to a tool called the EEG Builder.5 The DHS tool enables emergency planners to 
“build an EEG” by selecting activities and tasks pertinent to the exercise they want to 
conduct in order to test the objectives they set forth in the exercise. These public health 
EEGs are created with the same process in mind. For example, if the objectives of an 
exercise are to (1) test the protocols for public health officials to assess an ill passenger 
arriving from a foreign country that is experiencing an outbreak of human cases of novel 
influenza and (2) determine whether isolation or quarantine are needed for the 
passengers and crew, the exercise designers might want to select and combine relevant 
activities and critical tasks from both public health evaluation instruments: 
Epidemiologic Surveillance and Investigation and Isolation and Quarantine. In contrast, 
the activity in the Epi EEG entitled “Human Health Threat Analysis for Exposures to 
Toxins” is not pertinent to a scenario that depicts a known contagious disease. Thus, this 
latter activity would likely not be incorporated into the given exercise.   
METHODS  
Creating EEGs requires three types of expertise: (1) subject matter, (2) exercise 
development and design, and (3) evaluation.  
Subject Matter Expertise 
In creating these public health EEGs we acquired the first type of expertise initially from 
small groups of five to ten subject matter experts at the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC). This cadre of experts described the major categories of activity and 
related critical tasks that comprise their jobs. The categories and associated tasks 
became the major elements of the EEG detailed in the Results section. Their discussion 
was based on the fifteen DHS National Planning Scenarios,6 which cover an array of 
natural and man-made disasters (e.g., an outbreak of pulmonary anthrax or a pandemic 
of influenza). 
Next, this work was vetted with larger groups of ten to twenty state and local subject 
matter experts, including representative members from the Council of State and 
Territorial Epidemiologists, the National Association of County and City Health 
Officials, the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, and the International 
Society for Disease Surveillance. The expertise of these public health professionals was 
obtained at nationally convened meetings and by requests for commentary through 
their professional associations. Face-to-face meetings were followed by phone and email 
consultation to ensure that the instruments accurately captured in words what the 
experts think and do in practice. In addition, we searched the published literature to get 
even more detail and to assure that the evaluation instruments are consistent with how 
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experts have handled real incidents in their particular disciplines. The expert subject 
matter content in the EEGs is the result of all the above consultations and deliberations. 
Our goal was to strike a balance between having enough accurate content without 
having too much unnecessary content. Inaccurate content or omissions of critical steps 
can lead to poor performance and misunderstanding of public health’s role, but too 
much unnecessary content prevents the instruments from being practical.  
Exercise Development and Design and Evaluation 
We acquired the second type of expertise, exercise development and design, from CDC 
staff who are DHS-certified Master Exercise Practitioners. We obtained the third type of 
expertise, evaluation, from CDC experts in evaluation practice. Collectively, these 
individuals helped transform the subject matter expert content into action steps that can 
be observed and evaluated during an exercise.  
RESULTS  
The Elements of an EEG  
The public health EEGs are organized like the DHS EEGs, namely Capability 
Description, Capability Outcome, Activities, Critical Tasks, and Observation Keys.7 
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Figure 2. Narrative example of hierarchy depicted in Figure 1. 
 
DESCRIPTION OF EEG ELEMENTS 
Capability Description  
The capability description is a broad overview of the resources (i.e., personnel, 
equipment, supplies) that contribute to management of a given emergency. It is what 
the capability offers to the disaster.  
Capability Outcome 
The capability outcome is the anticipated result of the collective effort provided by the 
Capability.   
Activities 
Activities are category headings for critical tasks that share a similar purpose. For 
example, an overall capability might include the public health activities of surveillance, 
case investigation, and mitigation and containment. Activities are subdivided into 
critical tasks. 
Mission: Manage the Outbreak 
 
Capability: Epidemiologic Surveillance and Investigation (Appendix A) 
 
Activity 2: Case investigation to confirm the outbreak 
 
Activity Description: Determining to whom the event is occurring, what is the nature of 
the event, and when and where it is occurring (i.e., the who, what, when, where, and how). 
 
Performance Measure: Health Alert Network messages must be of minimally 
acceptable quality (applies also to health alerts generated by jurisdictions that have 
the same intent and purpose as official Health Alert Network alerts). For quality 
criteria, see Appendix A2, Activity 2, Work Product Criteria.  
 
Critical Tasks and Observation Keys 
 Confirm the existence of an unusual occurrence or event 
 Case report data interpreted to determine meaning and implications; epidemiologic 
clues evaluated 
 Syndromic surveillance data analyzed using aberration detection (if available and 
appropriate for use in given situation)  
 Alternate explanations considered (e.g., increased clinician awareness as a result of 
recent media attention to certain diseases, new physicians or clinics in the vicinity, 
changes in diagnostic methods. 








Performance Measures (Epi EEG only) 
Performance can be measured in terms such as time (e.g., the ambulance arrived within 
ten minutes of dispatch), accuracy (e.g., the triage nurse accurately categorized the 
patient’s level of care required as “immediate” because the patient had life-threatening 
injuries), and quality (e.g., the attending physician administered the correct treatment). 
The Epi EEG suggests some performance measures which might serve as standards for 
evaluating the quality of decisions and work products.  
Critical Tasks 
Critical tasks, indicated with a checkbox ( ), describe steps that are deemed critical 
and, therefore, must be done to achieve the expected outcome of the Activity and, 
ultimately, the capability. Critical tasks are usually performed in sequence, in the 
preferred order typically followed by subject matter experts.  
Observation Keys 
Observation keys, indicated with a checkmark (), are subdivisions of each critical task, 
intended to help evaluators identify whether responders have met important indicators 
for each critical task. They do not cover every action to be taken by responders; rather, 
they provide supplemental information as needed to enhance the usefulness of the 
instrument. 
HOW THE TWO PUBLIC HEALTH EEGS DIFFER FROM EACH OTHER 
Epidemiologic Surveillance and Investigation  
Only the Epi EEG includes some suggested performance measures, which may be used 
to judge the quality of responder performance. These performance measures offer 
criteria for determining the quality of certain decisions made and work products 
generated in the course of executing this capability. Quality is important because 
responders in other capabilities rely heavily on the decisions and work products handed 
off to them from the Epi capability. To conduct their own work, they need these 
products to be of acceptable quality. Disaster management literature repeatedly cites the 
hand-offs, or interfaces, between capabilities, as exceptionally prone to failure if the 
work that links them is inadequate or missing.8 When decision making is faulty, work 
products are of poor quality, or work products do not get handed off to the correct, 
linked capability the emergency response system becomes disorganized.  
Because these performance measure criteria are complex with multiple variables to 
consider for a single decision, we included the criteria as an appendix to avoid 
repeatedly diverting the reader’s attention from the flow of logic and sequence of critical 
tasks in the body text. The performance measure is described under its related activity, 
and the associated criteria are located in Appendix A2: Criteria for Performance. 
Isolation and Quarantine  
In contrast to the Epi EEG, the Isolation and Quarantine EEG embeds decision-making 
criteria in the body text. The decisions presented in this instrument frequently have only 
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two variables [e.g., Patient needs hospital-level care (yes/no)]. Including simple criteria 
in the body text does not disrupt logic and sequence.  
Though the decision-making criteria are simple, the Isolation and Quarantine EEG 
contains many decisions. For example, when a public health professional is determining 
whether a patient’s home, or alternate facility, is a suitable site for isolation or 
quarantine, that professional must determine whether the site has basic necessities such 
as utilities, ventilation, showers, and food preparation areas. If essential needs cannot 
be met, the public health responder assessing the suitability of the site should judge the 
site unacceptable. The evaluator can ask the public health official to “think out loud” and 
voice the criteria he is considering when determining site suitability. The evaluator can 
then use the criteria as a guide to ascertain whether the official is considering those 
criteria that experts expect to be considered.  
DISCUSSION 
How to Use the Public Health EEGs 
The public health EEGs are primarily for use in operations-based (e.g., functional, full-
scale) exercises, but they can guide the evaluation of discussion-based (e.g., tabletop) 
exercises as well. These exercise types are more fully explained in the DHS, HSEEP 
Policy and Guidance; Volume I, HSEEP Overview and Exercise Program 
Management.9 The public health EEGs can also be used to de-brief following routine 
disease outbreak investigations (i.e., routine after-action reviews) to assess the quality of 
decisions made and actions taken during the investigations. The EEGs are intended for 
use as part of a comprehensive program to assess preparedness. Evaluations of 
preparedness depend on other factors such as quality of exercise design, 
appropriateness of exercise scope, and assumptions made by planners (e.g., use of 
volunteers to distribute assets from the Strategic National Stockpile assumes that the 
volunteers will show up). 
Not all elements of an EEG apply to every scenario or to every phase of a scenario. 
Subject matter experts are needed to create EEGs and their knowledge and judgment 
are equally needed to ensure correct application of the content. Their expertise is 
essential to all phases of exercise development. Experts should help to set the objectives 
for the exercise, define the exercise scope, ensure the accuracy of the scenario and its 
applicability to the proposed exercise, participate as evaluators, and guide the creation 
and implementation of a corrective action plan to improve response. In addition, when 
developing exercises for public health it is always prudent to consult published 
guidance, such as that available from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, as 
well as other expert literature, in order to assure that the exercise materials reflect the 
most current and accurate information available. This is likewise the case for any 
responder discipline and its expert knowledge base.      
The EEGs obviate the need to memorize essential steps. Just as experienced pilots 
use preflight checklists to ensure review of critical steps before take-off, these public 
health EEGs prompt evaluators to look for certain evidence of planning before an 
exercise and particular decisions, actions, and work products during an exercise. As 
evaluators examine plans and observe exercise play they can take notes directly on a 
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printed copy of the EEG. They can record their observations guided by descriptions of 
elements they should expect to see. 
The Relationship Between EEGs and After Action Reports/Improvement 
Plans (AAR/IPs) 
Purposes of evaluation include the improvement of organizational and individual 
performance.10 Exercises are typically followed by close examination of the actions taken 
and decisions made by responders to determine if the exercises’ objectives were met. If 
the objectives were not met, emergency responders and planners try to identify areas 
needing improvement. They especially review deficiencies in planning, organizational 
structure, training, equipment, and personnel staffing. Their findings are captured in 
After Action Reports (AAR), and, subsequently, in Improvement Plans (IP) to address 
deficiencies.    
According to the previously mentioned DHS EEG Builder:  
Exercise Evaluation Guides (EEGs) have been developed to assist in the 
evaluation of exercises by providing evaluators with consistent standards and 
guidelines for observation, data collection and analysis, and report writing. Using 
the EEGs can help you develop stronger and more consistent After Action 
Report/Improvement Plans (AAR/IP). EEGs provide exercise evaluators with a 
manageable tool with which they can collect data during an exercise, in a format 
allowing the easy transfer of information to the AAR/IP.11   
Limitations of the Public Health EEGs  
These public health EEGs are only a starting point for exercise evaluation. One 
limitation of these EEGs is that their content has been vetted, but they have not been 
field tested. Another limitation is their use in highly controlled and applied settings has 
not been systematically studied. Their strengths and weaknesses can best be discovered 
by using them during actual exercises.  
AN AGENDA FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
These public health EEGs are offered for current use, but they are also offered to excite 
research in the field of exercise evaluation. Further research is proposed in the following 
areas.  
Setting Performance Standards  
For these public health EEGs, experts suggested standards for appropriate action and 
acceptable levels of quality. Performance standards for timeliness are not yet defined. 
More experience is needed to verify that the activities and tasks described in these 
instruments are the correct and necessary ones to manage a variety of public health 
emergencies. Additional study is also needed to set performance standards for 
timeliness and to further define standards for quality. Ideally, standards to define the 
actions that responders might typically take and the decisions that they are likely to 
make in various scenarios would already be worked out, vetted, tested, and agreed upon. 
Such is not the case for many disciplines, and certainly not for public health, a relative 
newcomer to the arena of emergency response.   








Furthermore, these EEGs will be most useful as assessment tools when the activities and 
tasks described in them are weighted and scored. Weights and scores reflect the relative 
contribution of each element toward achieving desired performance outcomes. For 
example, when the Epi EEG is used to evaluate performance during an outbreak 
investigation, are the tasks “Confirm the diagnosis” and “Create an interim case 
definition” equally critical? If not (e.g., if one task is more critical to identifying cases, 
contacts, and risk factors than the other) the more critical task should receive more 
weight in the assessment instrument. Expert judgment is probably the highest level of 
rigor currently available. Nevertheless, experience through widespread use should 
enable assigning realistic weights and scores to the EEG elements. 
The Need for Standardized Exercises 
To determine how well prepared one jurisdiction is compared to another, standardized 
exercises are needed. In a standardized exercise each jurisdiction conducts the exercise 
using the same scenario, under a standard set of conditions and a standard set of 
assumptions. Using standardized exercises evaluators can create an evaluation 
instrument specifically tailored to the exercise. In this manner, the entire “test” – the 
exercise and its evaluation guide – is uniform. Standardizing the “test” enables 
evaluators to judge performance more fairly and equitably across jurisdictions and 
responders. The most intriguing aspect of a standardized exercise, however, is that 
standardization enables the ability to model the effects that different responder 
decisions and actions have on the exercise objectives. When responders in an exercise 
can see the real impact their decisions and actions have on outcomes, the simulated 
experiences presented in exercises begin to more closely resemble reality.12   
CONCLUSION   
Public health responders recognize that exercises are a time-tested means to practice 
skills and prepare for real events. However, standardized instruments to guide the 
process of public health exercise evaluation are recently introduced and un-tested. 
Nevertheless, these EEGs serve an important purpose to assure that critical planning 
and performance elements are addressed and evaluated in any exercises involving the 
two capabilities presented in this article. There are no absolute “gold standards” to 
evaluate public health’s capabilities for all hazards under all conditions. Therefore, one 
cannot possibly overstress how essential are subject matter experts, emergency 
planners, exercise developers, and responders who have played in many exercises to the 
creation of more realistic exercises and better evaluation tools. Even these public health 
EEGs warrant further examination to determine if they are the best design as evaluation 
instruments. We anticipate that exercise evaluation will come to be an area of expertise 
in its own right, leading subject matter experts, exercise designers, and evaluation 
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Epidemiologic Surveillance and Investigation 





Description: For the purpose of this article epidemiologic surveillance and 
investigation is the capability to establish and maintain systems to collect exposure and 
disease data; analyze data; detect aberrations; investigate and confirm unusual patterns; 
actively search for persons exposed to, potentially exposed to, or ill from biologic, 
chemical, or radiologic agents; alert medical and response partners; determine factors 
that put populations at risk; communicate with the public; report on and present 
investigation findings; recommend countermeasures; and study causes of epidemics and 
toxic exposures. Epidemiologic surveillance and investigation is an iterative process. 
New information learned while conducting the activities described in this capability is 
added to known information, and many steps are then repeated to improve the 
understanding of the event. In this manner the inferences made and the conclusions 
drawn from the information evolve over time during the investigation.     
Outcome: The desired outcome is to prevent exposure to and control illness from 
infectious and toxic agents. 
Note: The evaluation instruments are designed to be modular. Not all elements 
contained in this instrument apply to every situation. Subject matter experts and other 
emergency response planners should together determine which capabilities to 
strengthen in their jurisdictions. They, then, select which instruments and which 
elements (activities, tasks, observation keys, and performance criteria) apply to the 
exercise they design. The selection of modules, and how they are applied, greatly 
depends on the particular disease or exposure chosen and its related scenario. Exercise 
developers should consult current federal program guidance relevant to the disease or 
exposure and scenario chosen in order to assure exercise materials are created using the 
most up-to-date and accurate information available.      
 








ACTIVITY 1: ONGOING SURVEILLANCE AND DETECTION 
Activity Description: Monitoring disease and exposure data in the jurisdiction and 
raising awareness of unusual occurrences or patterns.13 
Tasks and Observation Keys 
  Analyze surveillance data according to existing plans and protocols. 
 A knowledgeable public health professional(s) is available to receive disease 
reports 24 hours per day /7 days per week /365 days per year (24/7/365)   
 Case reports from all sources validated 
 Surveillance data monitored to watch for symptoms in exposed individuals 
 Surveillance data monitored to watch for complications in persons receiving 
medical countermeasures 
 Surveillance data monitored to direct and evaluate public health interventions 
 Surveillance data monitored to generate hypotheses for further evaluation 
 Surveillance data monitored to identify trends in target populations 
 Surveillance data monitored to identify changes in infectious agents (e.g., 
antimicrobial resistance, changes in influenza virus structure) 
◊◊◊ 
ACTIVITY 2: CASE INVESTIGATION TO CONFIRM THE OUTBREAK 
Activity Description: Determining to whom the event is occurring, what is the nature 
of the event, and when and where it is occurring (i.e., the who, what, when, where, and 
how). 
Performance Measure: Public health agency personnel make a correct 
decision whether to conduct further epidemiologic investigation.  (For quality 
criteria, see Appendix A2, Activity 2, Decision-Making criteria - Whether an 
aberration in surveillance data warrants an investigation)  
Performance Measure: Health Alert Network (HAN) messages must be of 
minimally acceptable quality (applies also to health alerts generated by 
jurisdictions that have the same intent and purpose as official Health Alert 
Network alerts). (For quality criteria, see Appendix A2, Activity 2, Work Product 
Criteria - Health Alerts.)  
Tasks and Observation Keys 
 Confirm the existence of an unusual occurrence or event 
 Case report data interpreted to determine meaning and implications; 
epidemiologic clues evaluated 
 Syndromic surveillance data analyzed using aberration detection (if available and 
appropriate for use in given situation)  
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 Alternate explanations considered (e.g., increased clinician awareness as a result 
of recent media attention to certain diseases, new physicians or clinics in the 
vicinity, changes in diagnostic methods)14  
 Confirm the diagnoses 
 Field investigation begun, as needed, to gather patient information and examine 
reported cases 
 Clinical syndrome determined 
 Epidemiologic factors determined (i.e., person, place, time) 
 Laboratory and diagnostic tests conducted (as applicable to scenario) and results 
reviewed 
 Create an interim case definition 
 Inclusion criteria described 
• Clinical criteria (symptoms, signs, illness onset, and pertinent diagnostic 
tests—e.g., chest x-ray; liver enzymes; gram stain) 
• Epidemiologic criteria (person, place, and time) 
• Laboratory criteria (culture results and dates) 
 Case classified (suspected, probable, confirmed) 
 Exclusion criteria described (e.g., human monkeypox—a case without a rash that 
does not develop a rash within 10 days of onset of clinical symptoms consistent 
with monkeypox) 
 Start case line listing (adapt case report form to begin case series) 
 Case definition data recorded (clinical, epidemiologic, laboratory, and exclusion 
criteria) 
 Established or suspected risk factors recorded 
 Demographic information recorded 
 Contact information recorded to enable follow-up 
 Find cases 
 Passive surveillance increased [e.g., case definition and guidance disseminated 
via HAN and other communication methods- e.g., Epidemic Information 
Exchange (Epi-X) to facilitate case-finding] 
 Active surveillance instituted (may involve surveys, reviews of existing records 
and new admissions)  
 Media outreach considered 
 Interview case-patients 
 Epidemiologists providing surge from assisting organizations used same case 
report forms as responding epidemiologists 
 Hypothesis-generating (i.e., open-ended, open-minded) questions asked  
 Case characteristics identified, sufficient to determine case status: clinical, 
epidemiologic, laboratory 
 Medical care and treatments documented 
 Disposition, complications, death documented 
 Patient demographic and contact information documented 
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 Healthcare provider contact information documented 
 Identify potentially exposed individuals (i.e., trace contacts) 
 Contacts of confirmed case-patients are identified to determine exposure status 
 Demographic information recorded  
 Contact information recorded to enable follow-up 
 Decide when and whether to notify law enforcement. If decision is to involve law 
enforcement: 
 Agency protocols followed in determining need to contact law enforcement 
officials 
 Law enforcement personnel needed for joint investigation notified 
 Collaboration initiated 
 Epidemiologic investigation data analyzed and interpreted in coordination with 
data from law enforcement investigation 
 Ongoing briefings conducted 
 Relevant evidence identified and collected 
 Efforts with scientific/forensic testing laboratories coordinated 
 Chain of custody maintained 
 Complete line listing or create database of ill, exposed, and potentially exposed 
persons. 
 Ill, exposed, and/or potentially exposed persons identified and documented. 
 Database updated as new cases identified 
 Sufficiency of line list or database to describe cases and test hypotheses assessed 
 Need for survey considered 
 
 Integrate into Incident Command System (ICS) according to plan  
 Epidemiologists received work assignments from appropriate ICS supervisor 
 Epidemiologists reported information through correct ICS chain of command 
 Epidemiologists requested resources through correct ICS chain of command 
◊◊◊ 
ACTIVITY 3: DETERMINE WHO IS AT RISK OF BECOMING ILL  
Activity Description: Collecting information about case-patients in order to identify 
traits, conditions, and circumstances that are putting people at risk to get sick.  
Tasks and Observation Keys 
 Provide case descriptive epidemiology (how much? when? where? among whom?) 
 Cases oriented by:  
• Person (unique characteristics and attributes of the case-patients)  
• Place [where is the outbreak occurring (e.g., clustered? Along drinking 
water distribution channels? Scattered throughout the country? etc.)  
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• Time (Date of illness onset—if know onset of illness and causative 
agent’s incubation period can infer when exposed or, if know when 
exposed and onset of illness, can determine incubation period and infer 
causative agent)    
 Case counts determined (how big is the outbreak) 
 Time course of event determined 
 Epidemic (“Epi”) curve generated  
  By examining data from ill persons try to determine mode of transmission, if possible  
 Investigation data already collected carefully reviewed 
 Direct contact spread considered 
 Droplet spread considered   
 Airborne spread considered 
 Vehicle spread considered (e.g., food, water) 
 Vector-borne spread considered 
  By examining the “epi” curve try to infer information about exposure 
 Point source, single exposure considered 
 Point source, continuous exposure considered 
 Person-person spread considered   
 Mixed source considered 
  Conduct an additional survey(s) to gather more specific information about ill persons 
to determine who is at risk of getting sick, if needed 
 Investigation data already collected carefully reviewed 
 Additional questions to be asked determined   
 Survey instrument created 
 Survey conducted 
◊◊◊ 
ACTIVITY 4: USE DESCRIPTIVE EPIDEMIOLOGY TO DEVELOP A 
PRELIMINARY HYPOTHESIS ABOUT WHAT EXPOSURE COULD BE 
CAUSING THE DISEASE  
Activity Description: Taking into account all that has been learned so far in the 
investigation, make an educated guess about what exposure could be making people sick 
(e.g., ate a hamburger at restaurant X; breathed the air in a certain building; had a 
medical procedure with a particular type and brand of device). The guess must be a 
plausible explanation of the facts uncovered during the investigation.   
Tasks and Observation Keys 
 Review descriptive epidemiology to formulate plausible explanations about how the 
disease is transmitted and what exposure is causing people to become ill 
 Clinical data reviewed 
 Epidemiologic data reviewed 
 Results of laboratory testing reviewed 
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 Knowledge of causative agent, if known, reviewed  
 Environmental investigation reviewed 
 Veterinary investigation reviewed, if applicable 
 Vector-borne investigation reviewed, if applicable 
 Forensic/law enforcement investigation reviewed, if applicable 
 Develop a hypothesis to explain what specific exposure(s) might be causing the 
disease 
 Likely causes prioritized to guide recommendations for control measures  
 Hypothesis reviewed to ensure it is consistent with the clinical, laboratory, and 
epidemiologic facts of the investigation 
◊◊◊ 
ACTIVITY 5: CONDUCT ANALYTIC STUDY(S), IF NEEDED 
Activity Description: Some outbreaks never actually make it to the analytic study 
phase. When control measures are instituted early after the case investigation has 
begun, and they prove effective, an analytic study might be deemed un-necessary. 
However, further analytic study might be needed to test preliminary hypotheses if 1) the 
cause of the outbreak remains unknown; 2) control measures are not working; and/or; 
3) critical information necessary to better understand and monitor the event remains 
elusive. Having specific knowledge about the problem improves the ability to 
recommend measures to control it. If the preliminary hypothesis is not supported, new 
hypotheses are generated and tested. 
 Test hypothesis using appropriate epidemiologic investigative tests and methods  
 Case definition applied consistently to all persons being investigated  
 Non-ill persons (controls) are selected for comparison groups using appropriate 
analytic study methods  
 Information on ill and non-ill persons analyzed 
 Appropriate statistical tests selected to test hypothesis 
 Investigation continued and new hypothesis developed, if statistical tests indicate 
no significant difference between ill and non-ill persons on the incriminated 
exposure, or if incriminated exposure does not “square” with the facts [e.g., iced 
tea (incriminated exposure) does not harbor Clostridium botulinum (case 
investigation fact)] 
 Conduct an additional survey(s), as needed, to gather more specific information about 
ill and non-ill persons (controls) to determine what exposure is causing the disease 
 Investigation data already collected carefully reviewed 
 Additional questions to be asked determined   
 Survey instrument created 
 Survey conducted 
◊◊◊ 
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ACTIVITY 6: WRITE AND DISSEMINATE INTERIM REPORT(S) AND 
FINAL REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION  
Activity Description: Communicating findings is an essential step in an 
epidemiologic investigation. Reports of the investigation’s progress (interim reports) 
should be disseminated to appropriate officials per agency protocol. Epidemiologists can 
provide protective action guidance and recommend countermeasures to control an 
outbreak, but they rely on other decision-makers to take action on the guidance and 
recommendations. Therefore, epidemiologists must be able to present their thinking 
and findings in a manner that convinces others to act. At the conclusion of the 
investigation a report of the results (final report) should also be prepared, disseminated, 
and archived per public health agency protocol.  
Performance Measure: Interim reports generated during an epidemiologic 
investigation must be of minimally acceptable quality. (For quality criteria, see 
Appendix A2, Activity 6, Work Product Criteria – Interim epidemiologic investigation 
reports.). Report information will improve as investigation continues and level of 
certainty increases. 
Performance Measure: Final reports generated during an epidemiologic 
investigation must be of minimally acceptable quality. (For quality criteria, see 
Appendix A2, Activity 6, Work Product Criteria – Final epidemiologic investigation 
report) 
 Draft and disseminate interim report(s) of the epidemiologic investigation. (Note: 
This step occurs frequently throughout the investigation) 
 All confirmed and suspected cases to date included by person, place, and time  
 Epidemiologic statistics reported, as needed 
 Report is disseminated to appropriate authorities per public health agency 
protocol 
  After the investigation is concluded, write and disseminate a final report. Information 
should be addressed and documented in a manner that reveals the thinking that 
underlies the investigator’s decisions and actions (i.e., “show your thinking”) 
 Report prepared consistent in content and format with public health agency 
protocol 
 Typical format used in peer-reviewed publications considered (i.e., Introduction, 
Background, Methods, Results, Discussion) 
 Report disseminated per public health agency protocol 
 Report archived per public health agency protocol 
◊◊◊ 
ACTIVITY 7: MITIGATION AND CONTAINMENT 
Activity Description: Using the findings of an epidemiologic investigation to 
recommend countermeasures to control or stop the outbreak. 
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Performance Measure: Epidemiologist’s recommendations for mitigation and 
containment strategies must be defensible (For quality criteria see Appendix A2, 
Activity 7, Decision-making Criteria for Communicable Disease - What countermeasures 
to recommend) 
Performance Measure: Epidemiologist’s presentation of findings and 
countermeasure recommendations must be of minimal acceptable quality. (For quality 
criteria, see Appendix A2, Activity 7, Work Product Criteria – Epidemiologist findings 
and countermeasure recommendations for policy-makers.) 
Tasks and Observation Keys 
 Design mitigation and containment strategies for communicable diseases. Relevant 
epidemiologic principles considered.   
 Eliminate, control, or reduce infectiousness of reservoirs, including animal 
reservoirs 
 Reduce contact rate between susceptibles (persons susceptible to infection) and 
potential infectives (potentially infectious case-patients) considered, if applicable 
 Reduce probability potential sources are infectious (e.g., reduce the prevalence of 
infection in the community) 
 Reduce biological susceptibility of suscebtibles 
 Reduce biological infectiousness of infectives 
 Interrupt transmission between infectives and susceptibles, given contact 
 Increase herd immunity (i.e., population level effects) 
 Reduce duration of infectiousness  (i.e., provide interventions such as treatment 
or vaccination as soon as possible 
 Recommend mitigation and containment strategies (For quality criteria, see Appendix 
A2, Activity 7, Work Product Criteria) 
 Population targeted to receive control measures identified (i.e., at risk 
population) 
 Appropriate measures to control disease and exposure recommended 
 Medical treatment for confirmed case-patients recommended 
 Provide public health information on investigation, mitigation, and containment 
strategies to emergency public information officials for release  
 Release approved by legally recognized public health authority 
 Release provided by Joint Information Center, if ICS established 
 Interaction with public information officials continues throughout investigation 
 Monitor effectiveness of mitigation steps 
 Adverse reactions of public health interventions monitored 
 Recommendations updated 
 Coordinate examination of deceased suspected case-patients with the medical 
examiner and/or coroner 
 Fatality management personnel notified of deceased patients 
 Forensic and/or information provided to the medical examiner/coroner 
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 Fatality information periodically updated per protocol  
◊◊◊ 
ACTIVITY 8: INFORMATION SHARING FOR OUTBREAK OF FOODBORNE 
ILLNESS15  
Activity Description: Exchanging information with colleagues (e.g., infectious 
disease epidemiologists, laboratorians, food safety specialists, environmental health 
specialists) who contribute their own expertise to investigating and controlling an 
outbreak of foodborne illness.  
Tasks and Observation Keys 
 Share investigation findings between infectious disease epidemiologists and assisting 
laboratorians, food safety specialists, and environmental health specialists for findings 
that relate to food facility inspection and product trace-back. 
 Initial assessments of food facilities conducted using emergency guidelines, 
Standard Operating Procedures, and applicable code  
 Product tracing conducted to determine the source, destination, and disposition, 
of adulterated or contaminated products  
◊◊◊ 
ACTIVITY 9: HUMAN HEALTH THREAT ANALYSIS FOR EXPOSURES TO 
TOXINS16  
Activity Description: Exchanging information with colleagues who contribute their 
own expertise to investigating exposures to toxins.  
Tasks and Observation Keys 
 Evaluate potential exposure pathways (source, fate and transport, point of exposure, 
route of exposure, susceptible population) 
 Source of chemical assessed (type, duration, and magnitude of release) 
 Delivery methods assessed (transportation routes; fate and transport in air and 
water; food and drug distribution networks) 
 Potential points of exposure where contact with agent could have occurred 
assessed (e.g., swimming area downstream of chemical plant; soil near chemical 
waste site; residential area near smoke-stack)  
 Exposure routes assessed (indigestion, inhalation, dermal, and ocular) 
 Receptor populations, including sensitive subpopulations considered (e.g., 
concentrations irritating to adults might be lethal to children) 
 Identify potential acute and chronic health effects 
 Acute health effects of exposure identified 
 Chronic health effects of exposure identified 
 Increased risk of birth defects determined 
 Exposed patients tracked to enable long-term medical monitoring 
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 Estimate potential effects on infrastructure and the environment 
 Safety concerns for rescue personnel working in contaminated environments 
evaluated 
 Human health threats from contamination of hospital emergency rooms and staff 
assessed 
 Increased risk for infectious diseases from lack of clean water, disruption of solid-
waste disposal services, and contact with sewage from broken pipes monitored 
 Human health threats from contamination of government emergency operations 
centers evaluated  
 Human health threats from contamination of houses, schools, and offices 
assessed 
 Identify health risk communication needs 
 Adherence to the Incident Action Plan communications plan demonstrated  
 Local Emergency Planning Committee consulted  
 









(Epidemiologic Surveillance and Investigation)  
Planning 
 
Planning is essential to successful execution of capabilities. It helps ensure adequate 
capacity in terms of staffing, equipment required, training needs, and optimal ways to 
organize the personnel and equipment to carry out the capability.  
 
Described below are elements of planning that should be in place before an event 
(exercise or real disaster). At a minimum these elements ought to be addressed, but the 
list is certainly not exhaustive. Completion of these elements can be documented, and 
the documents can be reviewed before exercising the capability.  
 Identify applicable laws, policies, and implementation procedures for public health 
reporting and notification  
 Applicable local, state, and federal laws and regulations examined 
 Due process and Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
requirements are followed 
 Jurisdiction’s disease reporting statutes selected conditions that require 
immediate reporting to the public health agency 
 Notifiable disease reporting laws provided to physicians, healthcare facilities, and 
laboratories  
 Updated requirements and/or guidance (from executive authority) 
communicated to healthcare providers, healthcare facilities, and laboratories 
 Identify all stakeholders and agency representatives or liaisons 
 Public, private, tribal, and border government stakeholders for public health 
services identified 
 Response plan partners identified 
 Identify data sources and data users 
 Sources of data identified (e.g., healthcare providers, poison control centers, 
human and animal laboratories, hospitals, infection control practitioners, media, 
general public) 
 Users of data are identified (e.g., public health practitioners, healthcare 
providers, law enforcement officials, public safety officials, elected officials) 
 Coordinate resources needed to detect events of public health significance17  
 Reporting and messaging mechanisms identified (e.g., disease report phone lines, 
web-based reporting systems, fax, Health Alert Network) 
 Reporting and messaging mechanisms tested routinely or per agency schedule 
 Surveillance systems for notifiable conditions in place and assessed periodically 
for: 
• Simplicity (structure and ease of operation) 
• Flexibility (adaptable to changing information needs)  
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• Data quality (completeness and validity) 
• Acceptability (willingness of reporting sources to participate) 
• Sensitivity (case definition, detection of outbreak) 
• Representativeness (of target population over time) 
• Timeliness 
• Stability (reliability and availability) 
 Coordinate resources needed to respond to events of public health significance 
 Level of competency of public health agency epidemiologists is consistent with 
their assigned roles and responsibilities18  
 Epidemiology Response Team personnel identified by name, title, and primary 
and secondary contact information 
 Epidemiology staff trained on Emergency Operations Center procedures 
 Epidemiology staff trained on National Incident Management System principles 
 Equipment to conduct routine investigations sufficient for number of 
Epidemiology Response Team personnel identified and available for use (e.g., 
personal protective equipment, information technology, communication, clinical 
sampling equipment, specimen collection material) 
 Law enforcement personnel needed for response identified 
 Procedures to notify law enforcement personnel in place 
 Ensure logistics support 
 Logistical support plans in place before events to ensure continued operations 
during the incident (e.g., technical support, security, surge capacity, deployment 
procedures, transportation, equipment, supplies, relief staff, designated lead on 
epidemiology investigation team) 
 Healthcare provider education 
 Educational materials (e.g., fact sheets) developed ahead of time for events of 
public health significance 
 Identify, assess, and prioritize threats 
 A Hazard and Vulnerability Analysis (HVA) is conducted by jurisdiction [The 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides instruction regarding 
how to conduct an HVA]  
 Jurisdiction’s Hazard and Vulnerability Analysis reviewed by infectious disease 
and environmental heath epidemiologists 
 Jurisdiction HazMat teams consulted 
 Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) consulted 
 Law enforcement consulted for information on known threats in vicinity 










(Epidemiologic Surveillance and Investigation) 
Criteria for Performance 
 
As noted in the Introduction (see Discussion: How to Use the Public Health EEGs), 
subject matter experts are needed throughout the design and conduction of exercises 
including participation as evaluators. As evaluators they are best served with written 
standards by which to judge how well responders trained in their same field perform 
their duties. Standards for quality, though, are difficult to define. Even expert opinions 
vary. In addition, criteria that should be factored in when making decisions about 
epidemiologic investigation depend on the agent involved, though criteria regarding 
type of content and format that ought to be present in work products can be more 
standard.  Because of these challenges uniform criteria to judge quality of performance 
are rarely offered. Despite these problems we deem it essential to offer some quality 
criteria for this Epidemiologic Surveillance and Investigation EEG. Criteria by which to 
judge the quality of responder performance are provided in this appendix for three 
Activities: Activities 2, 6, and 7.   
 
We divided quality criteria into decision making and work products because the results 
of these efforts must be handed off to responders in other linked capabilities, who await 
them to carry out their own work. If these decisions and work products are woefully 
inferior, then the missions of fellow responders in the linked capabilities may be 
seriously compromised.  
DECISION-MAKING 
To judge decision-making performance, evaluators should listen to discussions among 
epidemiologists during the exercise and determine whether they factor any relevant 
quality criteria into their decisions. Since the criteria to be considered differ by scenario, 
epidemiologists must participate in development of the exercise scenario to determine 
which criteria apply and under which conditions. The criteria they select as relevant are 
then included in the EEG, modified as necessary for the exercise. We propose quality 
criteria for two critical decisions: (1) whether an aberration in surveillance data warrants 
an investigation and (2) what countermeasures to recommend. 
WORK PRODUCTS 
To judge performance using work product criteria, evaluators should examine the 
relevant work products for quality content and format. We propose quality criteria for 
three work products: (1) Health Alerts, (2) interim and final epidemiologic investigation 
reports, and (3) epidemiologist findings and countermeasure recommendations for 
policy-makers.  
◊◊◊ 
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ACTIVITY 2: CASE INVESTIGATION TO CONFIRM THE OUTBREAK 
Decision-making Criteria - Whether an aberration in surveillance data warrants an 
investigation  
  Use epidemiologic clues consistent with those described in “Epidemiology of 
Bioterrorism”19 to decide whether to conduct further epidemiologic investigation  
 Presence of a large epidemic, with greater case loads than expected, especially in 
a discrete population (number of new case reports compared with baseline case 
reports) 
 More severe disease than expected for a given pathogen; unusual routes of 
exposure 
 Disease unusual for a given geographic area; found outside the normal 
transmission season; impossible to transmit naturally in the absence of normal 
vector for transmission 
 Multiple simultaneous epidemics of different diseases 
 Disease outbreak with zoonotic as well as human consequences 
 Unusual strains or variants of organisms or antimicrobial resistance patterns 
disparate from those circulating 
 Higher attack rates for those exposed in certain areas, such as inside a building if 
an aerosol was released indoors, or lower rates for in those inside a building if 
aerosol released outdoors 
 Intelligence that an adversary has access to a particular agent(s) 
 Claims by a terrorist of the release of a biologic agent 
 Direct evidence of the release of an agent, with findings of equipment, munitions, 
or tampering 
Work Product Criteria - Health Alerts  
 Include quality content in Health Alert20  
 Description of the problem provided (e.g., large numbers of patients with rapid 
onset of high fever followed by muscle aches, headache, and sore throat) 
 Time period during which problem is unfolding described 
 Magnitude of the problem (i.e., number of cases) described 
 Case definition for probable, suspected, and confirmed case (clinical, 
epidemiologic, and laboratory criteria) described, as information becomes 
available 
 Exclusion criteria described 
 Request to report suspected and probable cases issued 
 Instructions regarding to whom cases should be reported provided 
 Point of contact for more information provided  
 Statement of intent to provide further updates included 
 Statement that underscores urgency to report included  
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 Use quality format when presenting Health Alerts21  
 Bold, succinct subject line included 
 A unique identifier included 
 Date and time of issue included 
 Level of message urgency identified 
 Audience to whom the message is directed specified 
 Name, title, and contact information of the person(s) responsible for issuing the 
message included 
 Required action steps specified 
 Instructions to share information with targeted audiences included 
 Instructions to provide a point-of-contact or website address for more 
information included 
 Public health agency’s emergency contact information included in a prominent 
location 
 Estimated time for follow-up included, if the message was of the highest priority 
 Page numbers on each page and total number of pages identified 
 Content and format approved and authorized for dissemination according to 
public health agency protocol [or incident commander, unified command, or 
joint information center officer, if operating under National Incident 
Management System] 
◊◊◊ 
ACTIVITY 6: WRITE AND DISSEMINATE INTERIM REPORT(S) AND 
FINAL REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION   
Work Product Criteria – Interim epidemiologic investigation reports 
 Include quality content in interim epidemiologic investigation reports 
 Information tailored to intended audience 
 Description of the problem provided 
 Statement about ongoing nature of investigation included 
 Case ascertainment elements specified  
 Number of cases found to date (time of report) provided 
 Statement of whether countermeasures were implemented included  
 Target population for countermeasures identified 
 Barriers to countermeasure implementation identified 
 Status of descriptive and analytic studies provided  
 Statement of whether countermeasures depend on results of analytic studies 
included 
 Findings of descriptive and analytic studies provided 
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Work Product Criteria – Final epidemiologic investigation report 
 Include quality content in final epidemiologic investigation report 
 How notified or found out about the problem documented 
 How investigated the problem documented 
 Evidence on which based recommendations documented 
 Recommendations made documented 
 Effect of implementing recommendations documented 
 Reasons why recommendations were not or (could not) be implemented 
documented, if applicable 
 Further follow-up needed, if applicable 
◊◊◊ 
ACTIVITY 7: MITIGATION AND CONTAINMENT 
Decision-making Criteria for Communicable Disease - What countermeasures 
to recommend  
 Use epidemiologic principles, in particular the basic reproductive number (R0), where 
R0=dcp; d, the duration of infectiousness; c, the contact rate with susceptible hosts; and 
p the transmission probability—the probability of infecting the susceptible host when 
contact occurs, to decide what countermeasure strategies to recommend.22 
Interventions considered to: 
 Eliminate, control, or reduce infectiousness of reservoirs, including animal 
reservoirs 
 Reduce contact rate between susceptibles (persons susceptible to infection) and 
potential  infectives (potentially infectious case-patients) 
• Change behavior (host and or source; e.g., reduce crowding, heed travel 
advisories) 
• Find infectives—case finding--for intervention (e.g., isolation) 
• Isolate infectives  
• Trace susceptibles—contact tracing--for intervention (e.g., quarantine) 
• Quarantine exposed susceptibles [individual, community, geographic 
boundary (cordon sanitaire)] 
• Shelter-in-place (self-imposed separation of non-exposed persons) 
• Reduce number of infectives (e.g., fewer infectives encountered) 
• Promote social distancing (e.g., school closures, cancellation of mass 
gatherings, etc.) 
 Reduce probability potential sources are infectious (e.g., reduce the prevalence of 
infection in community) 
• Find infectives –case finding--for intervention (e.g., isolation, treatment) 
• Identify and control infectives 
• Vaccinate [i.e., induce immunity (noninfectious), or partial immunity (less 
infectious)] 
 
 Reduce biological susceptibility of susceptibles 
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• Vaccinate susceptibles (pre- and post-exposure) (i.e., susceptible generates 
own antibodies) 
• Give immune globulin (pre- and post-exposure) (susceptible given pre-
formed antibodies) 
• Give antimicrobial drug (pre- and post-exposure) 
• Treat co-factor (e.g., treat ulcerated or non-intact skin) 
 Reduce biological infectiousness of infectives 
• Treat case-patients 
• Vaccinate [i.e., induce immunity (noninfectious), or partial immunity (less 
infectious)] 
 Interrupt transmission between infectives and susceptibles, given contact 
• Physical barriers and chemical methods (masks, respirators, goggles, gloves, 
hand sanitizers, etc.) 
• Engineering controls (e.g., HEPA filters, negative pressure rooms) 
• Environmental controls (e.g., dis-infection, decontamination) 
 Increase herd immunity (population level effects).   
• Naturally acquired immunity  
• Fraction vaccinated (vaccine coverage) 
• Fraction fully protected (vaccine efficacy) 
 Reduce duration of infectiousness (i.e., provide interventions such as treatment 
or vaccination as soon as possible) 
Work Product Criteria -  Epidemiologist findings and countermeasure 
recommendations for policy-makers 
 Include quality content when presenting epidemiologist findings and 
countermeasure recommendations23  
 Problem discovered during investigation orally and visually described (e.g., can of 
tainted food, pictures of disease) 
 Number of cases found to date and time presented 
 Inferences and conclusions drawn from findings to date and time of presentation 
described 
 Countermeasure recommendations presented 
 Target population for countermeasures identified 
 Reasons for recommendations provided 
 Likely benefits and possible consequences of following recommendations 
described 
 Possible consequences of not following recommendations described 
 Alternative options offered, if any are being considered, and likely consequences 
discussed 
 Barriers to implementing countermeasures identified 
 
 
 Use quality format when presenting epidemiologist findings and countermeasure 
recommendations24   
 Simple, clear language used; use of technical jargon minimized 
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 Active voice, action verbs used 
 Concise sentences used 
 Information logically sequenced 
 Thinking obviously organized 
 Important information summarized 
 Presentation stays within allotted time 
 Handouts, if used, track with order of material presented 
 Visual aids (e.g., props and pictures) enhance, support, exemplify, and/or 
facilitate understanding of material covered 








Isolation and Quarantine 




Description: For the purpose of this article isolation and quarantine are defined as 
movement-restriction interventions to prevent the transmission of contagious illness. 
Isolation refers to the identification, separation, and restriction of movement of persons 
who are known to be ill with a contagious disease. Quarantine refers to the 
identification, separation, and restriction of movement of persons who have been 
exposed to a contagious disease but who may or may not become ill; such persons are 
potentially infectious. 
Because both of these interventions curtail a person’s right to freedom of movement, 
most public health officials hope affected persons will comply voluntarily with isolation 
and quarantine instructions. Occasionally, though, a court order is needed to enforce the 
restrictions. High priority must be given to gaining public cooperation with isolation 
and quarantine measures. Special attention must be paid to subpopulations of persons 
who might need additional assistance to understand and comply with isolation and 
quarantine interventions. Wherever these persons are confined (at home, in hospitals, 
or at alternate care facilities), they need information and support. They might need help 
getting food; monitoring their health; understanding altered workplace and school 
expectations; providing childcare, eldercare, or pet care; or finding financial assistance. 
Therefore, to be successful, isolation and quarantine involve the entire community. 
Typically, the isolation and quarantine capability covers only contagious biological 
agents, leaving toxic chemical or radioactive agents to be covered by the 
WMD/Hazardous Materials Response Capability. However, because the process of 
involuntary movement restriction for persons who might expose others to toxins or 
radioactive agents (e.g., by refusing decontamination) is similar to that for persons who 
might spread infectious agents, a special activity called Emergency Detention for 
Chemical or Radiation Exposure is included in this Isolation and Quarantine EEG. 
Outcome: The desired outcome is a limited spread of a newly introduced contagious 
disease. Persons who are infectious or potentially infectious are separated from others, 
prohibited from leaving confinement areas, provided with basic necessities of life, and 
monitored for health. Legal authority for these measures is clearly defined and 
communicated to the public. Logistical support is provided until the danger of 
transmission resides. 
Note: The evaluation instruments are designed to be modular. Not all elements 
contained in this instrument apply to every situation. Subject matter experts and other 
emergency response planners should together determine which capabilities to 
strengthen in their jurisdictions. They then select which instruments and which 
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elements (activities, tasks, observation keys, and performance criteria) apply to the 
exercise they design. The selection of modules, and how they are applied, greatly 
depends on the particular disease or exposure chosen and its related scenario. Exercise 
developers should consult current federal program guidance relevant to the disease or 
exposure and scenario chosen in order to assure exercise materials are created using the 
most up-to-date and accurate information available. 
◊◊◊ 
ACTIVITY 1: ORGANIZING INTO A TIER 3 PUBLIC HEALTH AND 
MEDICAL OPERATIONS FUNCTIONAL AREA (As Appropriate)  
Activity Description: Organizing in a Tier 3 Public Health and Medical Operations 
Functional Area when public health is the lead agency in a Unified Command or when 
supporting the jurisdiction’s Emergency Operations Center as lead for Emergency 
Support Function #8 (ESF#8).25  
Critical Tasks and Observation Keys 
 Organize within a public health and medical functional area in a National Incident 
Management System (NIMS)–compliant management structure  
 Isolation and quarantine operations logically aligned with hospital operations to 
facilitate coordination of effort  
 Use NIMS to coordinate support for Isolation and Quarantine activities and ensure 
that overall incident objectives and priorities are met 
 Requests for personnel, equipment, and supplies made through the jurisdiction’s 
Incident Command System(ICS)/NIMS structure 
 Requests for support made by using correct ICS forms 
◊◊◊ 
ACTIVITY 2: PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION—LAWFUL 
DISCLOSURE 
Activity Description: Handling protected health information according to privacy 
standards established pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA).26  
Critical Tasks and Observation Keys 
 Comply with HIPAA  
 As needed, covered entities (health plans, healthcare clearing houses, healthcare 
providers) informed about lawful disclosure of protected health information--
without authorization from persons whose information is being released-- when 
public health authorities, who are legally authorized to collect or receive the 
information, request it  
 Covered entities comply with legitimate information requests from public health 
authorities 
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 Public health authorities comply with regulations regarding use of disclosed 
protected health information  
 Resolve issues about protected health information  
 Public health legal advisors functioned as Technical Specialists in the ICS 
Planning Section, or wherever their specialized services are required 
 Public health legal advisors helped resolve disputes or questions about lawful 
disclosure of protected health information  
◊◊◊ 
ACTIVITY 3: EVALUATION OF PATIENT AND DETERMINATION OF NEED 
FOR MOVEMENT RESTRICTION 
Activity Description: Using epidemiologic, medical, and laboratory data to determine 
if person needs to be isolated or quarantined to protect the rest of the population and to 
assure adequate treatment and monitoring. 
Critical Tasks and Observation Keys 
 Identify persons who require isolation   
 Whether person is suspected or confirmed to be infected with a contagious 
pathogen is  established based on signs, symptoms, and available laboratory 
findings 
 Identify persons who should be quarantined 
 Whether person has been exposed to, or has likely been exposed to, a contagious 
pathogen, or has arrived from an established high-risk area  
 Consider relevant factors to decide whether to separate the person from the rest of the 
population and restrict his/her movement. The following are considered:  
• Pathogen factors (e.g., virulence, infectious dose, infectivity, ease and mode of 
transmission) 
• Host factors (e.g., susceptibility of the population, availability of treatment, 
effectiveness of treatment)  
• Environment factors (e.g., ability to achieve and enforce separation)  
• Legal factors (e.g., authority to isolate or quarantine based on the specific 
pathogen suspected or known) 
 Decide whether to isolate, quarantine, or release the individual 
◊◊◊ 
ACTIVITY 4: APPROPRIATE SETTING SELECTION 
Activity Description: Considering individual needs, circumstances, and exposure risk 
to family members and primary caregivers when selecting appropriate setting for 
isolation or quarantine.27   
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Critical Tasks and Observation Keys 
 Use answers to the following questions to determine appropriate settings: 
 Person needs hospital-level of care? (yes = hospital; no = home or facility) 
 Person can care for himself/herself? (yes = home; no = facility) 
 Person can monitor himself/herself for symptom deterioration? (yes = home; no 
= facility) 
 Person can minimize close contacts and contact with immuno-compromised 
persons in the household? (yes = home; no = facility) 
 A healthy primary caregiver is available? (yes = home; no = facility) 
 Person can stay in a home locally? (yes = home; no = facility (e.g., homeless, 
transient, tourist, business traveler, foreign traveler, displaced person, etc.) 
 Home is near a facility that can provide a higher level of medical care (yes = 
home; no = facility) 
 Person is willing to remain in isolation or quarantine for the full duration 
required? (yes =  home;  no = facility)  
 Person is in quarantine and deemed an essential worker? (yes = consider work 
quarantine; no = work quarantine not an option) 
 Decide an appropriate setting. The following considered:  
 Airborne infection isolation room in hospital 
 Home (including working from home) 
 Alternate healthcare facility  
 Work  
◊◊◊ 
ACTIVITY 5: VOLUNTARY ISOLATION OR QUARANTINE  
Activity Description: Seeking voluntary compliance with isolation and quarantine 
recommendations as the preferred and least restrictive means to separate infectious or 
potentially infectious persons from susceptible persons in the rest of the population. 
However, this option is also the most difficult to enforce and track, as few public health 
resources are available to monitor compliance.  
Critical Tasks and Observation Keys 
 Determine if persons requiring isolation or quarantine can and will comply 
voluntarily  
 Requests for voluntary compliance with isolation or quarantine issued only by 
authorized officials  
 Person agrees to comply with movement restrictions 
 Person demonstrates understanding of reasons for isolation or quarantine by re-
stating reasons in his/her own words 
 Person demonstrates understanding that consequences of not adhering to 
voluntary  movement restrictions can be court ordered confinement by re-stating 
consequences in his/her own words 
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 Person describes living circumstances that enable compliance (e.g., has a phone 
to enable monitoring, has family or friends who are willing to assist him, has 
stable housing situation)  
 Person demonstrates understanding of public health official’s monitoring and 
treatment instructions by discussing instructions with official and describing how 
he/she will carry out the instructions 
 Provide documents and instructions in person’s primary language 
 Reasons for isolation or quarantine provided  
 Instructions and guidance while under restriction provided in primary language 
to affected person and caregiver(s) 
 Estimate of time expected to remain in isolation or quarantine provided  
 Procedures for release from isolation or quarantine provided  
Obtain informed consent 
 Persons entering voluntary isolation or quarantine are asked to acknowledge 
their understanding of and agreement with the terms of the restriction, person 
informed of terms, understanding verified, and consent documented per agency 
protocol 
 Track person  
 Relevant information recorded and entered into a database to facilitate 
monitoring of health status and compliance with movement restriction 
◊◊◊ 
ACTIVITY 6: INVOLUNTARY ISOLATION OR QUARANTINE  
Activity Description: Compelling involuntary compliance with isolation and 
quarantine orders to separate infectious or potentially infectious persons from 
susceptible persons in the rest of the population.  
Critical Tasks and Observation Keys 
 Decide whether to order involuntary movement restriction for persons who pose a 
threat to the population.  The following should be considered: 
 Disease factors [e.g., highly contagious infection, stage of disease that person is in 
(perhaps no longer infectious), no or very limited treatment available]  
 Likelihood of compliance factors (e.g., person is a flight risk, is irresponsible, is 
unreliable) 
 If contemplating a federal quarantine order, the disease must be one listed as 
quarantinable in executive order(s).   
 Availability of resources to enforce and monitor (an especially relevant 
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 Determine which legal authorities to invoke  
 If public health officer has and exercises his/her own authority to order 
detention, written order signed, with date and time, using proper procedures and 
forms per agency protocol 
 If state/local public health officer issues detention order, court officials notified 
in order to facilitate appeals and future court proceedings  
 If court-ordered detention sought, state/local public health officials and/or their 
legal advisors contact court officials to petition a judge (or magistrate) for the 
order using proper procedures and forms per agency protocol 
 Provide reasons why involuntary movement restriction is required 
 Irrespective of the legal authority invoked, public health officials provided, in 
writing, the reasons and evidence to support an order for involuntary isolation or 
quarantine 
 Deliver detention order 
 Arrangements made with law enforcement officials to serve the detention order, 
if law enforcement is needed 
 Arrange transport of person to site of isolation or quarantine 
 Arrangements made with transport officials, if special transport is needed 
 Track person  
 Relevant information recorded and entered into a database to facilitate 
monitoring of health status and movement restriction 
 Prepare for detention hearing (typically 48–72 hours after initial detention order)  
 Evidence and statements prepared by public health officials for the hearing, 
during which government officials issuing or obtaining the initial detention 
order, the patient and/or his/her attorney, and a judge are present to hear 
arguments for and against continuing the involuntary restriction of patient’s 
movement  
 To avoid risk of infecting persons attending court proceedings, patient does not 
appear in person, but rather is represented by an attorney, if possible 
◊◊◊ 
ACTIVITY 7: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESPONSE PERSONNEL 
Activity Description: Ensuring that response personnel likely to come in contact with 
contagious persons use recommended personal protective equipment (PPE), follow 
protective action recommendations, and are offered appropriate prophylaxis and 
treatment  
Critical Tasks and Observation Keys 
 Prepare the incident medical plan (ICS Form 206) to protect and manage responder 
health  
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 Recommendations for personal protective equipment, pre-exposure prophylaxis, 
and other protective actions to minimize exposure risk for responders assisting 
infectious and potentially infectious patients provided to the ICS Safety Officer in 
the Incident Medical Plan prepared by the Logistics Section, Medical Unit  
 Recommendations for post-exposure prophylaxis and treatment, if available, 
described in the Incident Medical Plan  
 Recommendations for post-exposure prophylaxis and treatment, if available, 
offered to responders who are accidentally exposed to contagious patients 
 Court officials, attorneys, law enforcement officers, patient transporters, human 
services personnel, and others supporting isolation and quarantine operations 
included as responders 
 Isolation and quarantine for sick or exposed responders considered 
 Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) specialist, if available, assists responders 
 Responders coping with the psychological and emotional stress of managing a 
significant event involving contagious illness offered help of CISM specialist 
◊◊◊ 
ACTIVITY 8: HEALTH STATUS MONITORING  
Activity Description:  Assuring persons receive regular attention to detect trends in 
health status and problems with compliance.  
Critical Tasks and Observation Keys 
 Monitor health status of confined persons 
 Confined person’s health status monitored per agency protocol (e.g., daily visit, 
daily phone call, health status logged, etc.) 
 If health status deteriorates, action taken to re-evaluate need for higher level of 
medical care 
 If health status improves, action taken to re-evaluate need for confinement 
 Self-monitoring guidance issued, if appropriate 
 Monitor compliance with movement restrictions 
 Confined person’s compliance with movement restrictions monitored per agency 
protocol  
 If confined person is non-compliant with movement restrictions, action taken to 
re-evaluate need for higher level of restriction and enforcement (e.g., change 
individual from voluntary to involuntary isolation or quarantine, use electronic 
monitoring device [e.g., ankle bracelet], assign law enforcement to guard patient, 
incarcerate) 
◊◊◊ 
ACTIVITY 9: SITE ASSESSMENT  
Activity Description: Evaluating the suitability of a person’s home, a healthcare 
facility (e.g., isolation wards in sections of or in entire hospitals), or an alternative 
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healthcare facility (e.g., clinic, nursing home, school, auditorium, convention center, 
hotel, cruise ship) as a site for isolation or quarantine. 
Critical Tasks and Observation Keys 
 Evaluate all site types for basic necessities. The following considered:  
 Ability to practice social distancing among quarantinees 
 Utilities (water, electricity, garbage collection, bio-hazardous waste handling, 
heating and air conditioning) 
 Ability to isolate airflow to prevent spread of micro-organisms through heating, 
ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system (if airborne precautions 
indicated) 
 Acceptable ventilation  
 Lavatories and showers 
 Laundry facilities and supplies, including diaper service  
 Food preparation areas  
 Essential supplies (clothing, food, hand hygiene, thermometers, fever log, other 
medical equipment and supplies) 
 Mechanism for addressing special needs (e.g., filling prescriptions)  
 Methods for communication, including telephone (for monitoring by health staff, 
reporting of symptoms, gaining access to support services, and communicating 
with family)  
 Proximity to higher levels of care 
 Ability to monitor health, including provision of areas to conduct temperature 
checks, etc. 
 Evaluate person’s home for special considerations. The following considered:  
 The isolated person can be confined to a room in the home furthest from high-
traffic areas with the least opportunity for disease spread. This room has a 
closeable door.  
 The isolated person has access to a separate bathroom that will not be used by 
others during the period of isolation 
 Room ventilation is cut off from home’s central air conditioning unit, and room is 
frequently vented to the outside of the house (i.e., windows opened as often as 
possible), (if airborne precautions indicated) 
 Pets are removed from the household and alternative pet care is found  
 Evaluate healthcare or alternative healthcare facility for special considerations. The 
following considered:  
 Availability of airborne infection isolation rooms (if indicated) 
 Bed capacity and spatial separation of patients (social distancing) 
 Potential for makeshift negative pressure zones  
 Availability of autoclave  
 Ability to support designated level of care for ill patients (e.g., suction, oxygen 
available, if needed)  
 Ease of transporting patients to and within the facility (e.g., doors wide enough 
for gurneys) 
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 Ease of decontaminating and/or disinfecting rooms 
 Ease of securing the building  
 Ease of allowing family to visit the seriously ill  
 Proximity to residential areas  
 Proximity to space for staff, family members, clergy, counselors, equipment, 
supplies, food preparation, laboratory, decontamination, and mortuary  
 Access in and out of facility is controlled 
 Willingness of facility owner to allow structure to be used as an isolation facility  
 Ability to use a facility based on legal authority, if location not previously 
identified 
◊◊◊ 
ACTIVITY 10: WORK QUARANTINE  
Activity Description: Controlling infectious disease by quarantining at work. 
Critical Tasks and Observation Keys 
 Decide whether to allow work quarantine  
 Determine if worker considered essential to maintaining critical infrastructure 
(e.g., healthcare workers, police, fire fighters, utility workers) 
 Establish work quarantine 
 Quarantined persons stay home at all times when not working or stay at work, if 
home or alternative quarantine facilities are unavailable  
 Transportation arrangements for quarantined persons moving between home or 
facility quarantine and work ensure no exposure to susceptible persons, or person 
in quarantine uses barriers (e.g., mask and gloves, as appropriate) to minimize 
exposure to susceptible persons  
◊◊◊ 
ACTIVITY 11: ENTIRE FACILITY QUARANTINE 
Activity Description: Controlling infectious disease by quarantining an entire facility 
Critical Tasks and Observation Keys 
 Decide whether to quarantine an entire facility if  
• Facility has experienced a high potential for exposure  
• Facility has a particularly high case count 
 Quarantine of entire facility considered because above conditions met 
 Establish facility quarantine  
 Quarantined persons cohorted (when necessary) with family, friends, or persons 
exposed under similar circumstances 
 Efforts made to create makeshift negative pressure rooms or corridors, as 
appropriate  
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 Facility layout arranged for easy removal of quarantined persons to isolation, if 
signs or symptoms develop 
 Facility layout arranged for efficient monitoring, observation, and care  
 Temporary facilities (e.g., for food and laundry services) erected, if necessary 
 Generators are used to provide energy, heating, and cooling, if basic utilities are 
otherwise unavailable  
 Special arrangements and procedures for work quarantine are implemented for 
first responders and medical personnel  
 Access in and out of facility is controlled  
◊◊◊ 
ACTIVITY 12: ENTIRE COMMUNITY QUARANTINE (CORDON SANITAIRE) 
Activity Description: Controlling infectious disease by quarantining an entire 
geographic area such as an apartment complex, neighborhood, or section of 
community.28  
Critical Tasks and Observation Keys 
 Decide to quarantine an entire geographic area if 
• The area has experienced a high potential for exposure  
• The area has a particularly high case count 
 Quarantine of entire community considered because above conditions met  
 Establish quarantine perimeters 
 The size of perimeters that limit where the quarantine begins and end 
determined 
 Access controls into and out of quarantined area established by security or law 
enforcement officials  
 Access controls included setting-up buffer or warm zones between the quarantine 
(hot zone) and non-quarantine regions to limit contacts and facilitate delivery of 
essential goods and services, if appropriate 
 Access to hot zone permitted only to persons with properly authorized credentials 
 Special access provided to those requiring temporary entrance into quarantine 
(e.g., work quarantines, service providers, law enforcement, family members, 
friends, critical service providers, emergency responders, and business continuity 
staff)  
 Vehicles for transporting quarantined persons available, as needed  
 A transport call center to track and coordinate transport to and from quarantine  
established, in coordination with the local emergency management system and 
law enforcement officials and public health  
 Facilities established and maintained for nonresidents, homeless, and dislocated 
persons within the quarantined community  
◊◊◊ 
ACTIVITY 13: PUBLIC MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS  
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Activity Description: Differentiating between normal stress reactions and mental 
illness to provide appropriate care and support. 
Critical Tasks and Observation Keys 
 Promote normalcy 
 People confined in isolation and quarantine and the population at large provided 
access to an ongoing, reliable flow of credible information about the disaster and 
associated relief efforts 
 Persons confined in isolation and quarantine provided with means to contact 
family and friends (particularly important in the case of isolation, when family 
members are most worried about their sick relatives) 
 If death of a person in isolation is imminent, family members permitted into 
isolation area provided they use appropriate personal protective equipment and 
are willing to enter quarantine after the visit, if necessary  
 Normal cultural and religious events maintained or re-established (including 
grieving rituals conducted by religious practitioners)   
 Children and adolescents in quarantine provided access to formal or informal 
schooling and recreational activities 
 Adults and adolescents in quarantine provided concrete, purposeful, common-
interest activities to participate in  
 Provide psychological first aid29  
 Non-intrusive pragmatic care focused on listening to affected persons, but not 
forcing them to talk 
 Basic needs assessed and met to a reasonable extent  
 Company from significant others encouraged, but not forced 
 Basic information about common reactions to stress and trauma provided 
 Coordinate care for mentally ill 
 Care for urgent psychiatric complaints provided   
 Relevant treatment for persons with pre-existing psychiatric disorders 
maintained to avoid harmful, sudden discontinuation of medications 
◊◊◊ 
ACTIVITY 14: EMERGENCY DETENTION FOR CHEMICAL OR RADIATION 
EXPOSURE  
Activity Description: Identifying, separating, and restricting movement of persons 
who may have been exposed to a toxic or radioactive contaminant and can, therefore, 
potentially contaminate others. Persons exposed to toxic chemicals or radiation are 
expected to comply voluntarily with decontamination; their cooperation is typically 
assumed. Note: This activity will typically be led by law enforcement officials in 
collaboration with healthcare providers. The role of public health in this situation is to 
help characterize the event and differentiate infectious disease from chemical and 
radioactive materials exposure.  
 




HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME V, NO. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2009) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
 
40 
Critical Tasks and Observation Keys 
 Decide whether to order involuntary movement restriction and decontamination for 
persons who refuse decontamination and, therefore, pose a threat to others. The 
following considered: 
 Contaminant factors (e.g., likelihood that contaminant poses a significant 
exposure risk to others, amount of contamination present, no or limited 
treatment available)  
 Patient factors (e.g., patient is incoherent from effects of exposure, is a flight risk, 
is irresponsible, is unreliable) 
 Determine which legal authorities to invoke  
 If immediate detention required because of imminent and substantial risk of 
serious harm to self or others, peace officers (in many jurisdictions) can detain 
without a warrant 
 If public health officer has and exercises his/her own authority to order 
detention, written order signed, with date and time, using proper procedures and 
forms per agency protocol 
 If public health officer issues detention order, court officials notified in order to 
facilitate appeals and future court proceedings  
 If court ordered detention sought, public health officials and/or their legal 
advisors contact court officials to petition a judge (or magistrate) for the order 















(Isolation and Quarantine) 
Planning 
 
Planning is essential to successful execution of capabilities. It helps ensure adequate 
capacity in terms of staffing, equipment required, training needs, and optimal ways to 
organize the personnel and equipment to carry out the capability.  
Described below are elements of planning that should be in place before an event 
(exercise or real disaster). At a minimum these elements ought to be addressed, but the 
list is certainly not exhaustive. Completion of these elements can be documented, and 
the documents can be reviewed before exercising the capability.  
 Ensure incident planning activities are consistent with established National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) preparedness guidance.30 The following planning activities 
are consistent with NIMS guidance: 
 Exercises, consistent with Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 
(HSEEP) principles and practices 
 Personnel qualification and certification 
 Equipment acquisition and certification  
 Mutual aid agreements 
 Publications management  
 Information and intelligence management 
 Ensure that emergency operations plans follow NIMS principles. The following NIMS 
principles are evident in jurisdiction’s emergency operations plans:  
 Common terminology 
 Modular organization  
 Management by objectives 
 Reliance on an Incident Action Plan 
 Manageable span of control 
 Pre-designated locations and facilities 
 Comprehensive resource management 
 Integrated communications 
 Establishment and transfer of command 
 Chain of command and unity of command 
 Unified command 
 Accountability 
 Deployment 
 Establish applicable isolation and quarantine laws, policies, and procedures to do the 
following:31   
 Declare  a public health emergency  
 Remove and detain suspected or confirmed cases, contacts, and/or carriers who 
are or may be endangering the public health  
 Accept custody of detained persons from federal quarantine officers  
 Order mass quarantine  
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 Close public venues  
 Restrict intrastate and interstate modes of transportation  
 Order isolation and quarantine  
 Conduct judicial review  
 Terminate isolation and quarantine orders  
 Identify by person, job title, and contact information the persons who have legal 
authority to implement applicable isolation and quarantine laws, policies, and 
procedures 
 Persons in jurisdiction identified 
 Persons in jurisdictions of neighboring cities, counties, states, tribal 
governments, military installations, and cross-border foreign governments, 
identified as applicable  
 Provide evidence that jurisdiction emergency response plans show coordination 
among the following organizations and agencies: 
 Emergency management agency 
 Jurisdiction public health agencies, including tribal and military 
 Jurisdiction hospitals, including tribal and military 
 Law enforcement 
 Public safety  
 Jurisdiction judiciary and legal counsel to governing authorities  
 Public works (for retrieval and disposal of contaminated articles) 
 Public and private providers of critical goods and services (e.g., food, water, 
medical supplies, medical gas, clean linens, internet services, home healthcare, 
childcare, and eldercare for essential workers)  
 Ensure access to mainstream communications channels 
 Relationships with contacts in the broadcast media developed and maintained 
 Emergency Alert System (EAS) and other warning systems periodically tested 
 Develop a civic network or Community Outreach Information Network of trusted 
leaders within the community’s subpopulations to disseminate information outside of 
mainstream communication channels32  
 Subpopulations in the jurisdiction who cannot (or will not) receive, understand, 
or act on Isolation and Quarantine messages, or who might need special 
assistance are defined. These subpopulations may need assistance because of  
• economic disadvantage  
• limited language proficiency 
• disability (physical, mental, cognitive, sensory) 
• isolation (geographic [e.g., extremely rural], cultural [e.g., religious sect], 
social [e.g., homeless]  
• age 
 Subpopulations located and mapped by using Geographic Information Systems 
(GIS), highlighted streets maps, or other mapping techniques and forms of visual 
display 
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 Members of a community outreach information network, or other trusted 
information channels, identified to function as “nodes” that will convey messages 
to persons and households in the community (e.g., church outreach coordinators, 
homeowner association leaders, club administrators) 
 Ability to reliably reach Community Outreach Information Network (COIN) 
members, or persons functioning as “nodes,” and get acknowledgement that 
messages are received is exercised 
 Persons and households in the subpopulations randomly sampled to assess 
awareness and understanding of disseminated messages 
 Train relevant staff in disease exposure control measures and proper use of personal 
protective equipment 
 Staff who should be trained are identified 
 Training records maintained 
 Develop educational materials for isolation and quarantine. The following materials 
are developed:   
 Disease fact sheets  
 Frequently asked questions (FAQs) regarding isolation and quarantine  
 Proper setup of a home isolation room 
 Social distancing 
 Provide evidence of planning for employees (applies to business sector)33   
 Sick leave policies coordinated to support public health recommendations 
 Businesses prepared to extend (and ask for) grace periods for financial 
obligations affected by the emergency 
 Employee volunteerism to assist in emergencies encouraged 
 Continuity of Operations Plans (COOPs) developed 
 Business and public health leaders plan together 
 Perform community-wide inventory  
 Total number of hospital isolation beds available determined  
 Feasibility of alternative sites for additional isolation capacity determined 
 Stockpiles of personal protective equipment (e.g., N-95 respirators, surgical 
masks, goggles, face shields, gowns) established before events; contracts in place 
for rapid replenishment, if needed  
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